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_______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 This is a dispute about the proper allocation of costs to 
remediate a contaminated manufacturing site in Greenville, 
Pennsylvania.  From 1910 until 1986, Greenlease Holding Co. 
(“Greenlease”),1 a subsidiary of the Ampco-Pittsburgh 
Corporation (“Ampco”), owned the site and operated railcar 
manufacturing facilities there.  Trinity Industries, Inc. and its 
wholly-owned subsidiary, Trinity Industries Railcar Co. 
(together referred to as “Trinity”), acquired the site from 
Greenlease in 1986 and continued to manufacture railcars there 
until 2000.  An investigation by the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania into Trinity’s waste disposal activities resulted in 
a criminal prosecution and eventual plea-bargained consent 
decree which required, in relevant part, that Trinity remediate 
the contaminated land.  That effort cost Trinity nearly $9 
million.   
This appeal arises out of the District Court’s 
determination that, under the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9601 
et seq., (“CERCLA”), and Pennsylvania’s Hazardous Sites 
Cleanup Act, 35 Pa. Stat. § 6020.101 et seq., (“HSCA”), 
Trinity is entitled to contribution from Greenlease for 
                                              
 1  Greenlease was known first as the Greenville Metal 
Products Company and then as the Greenville Steel Car 
Company. For purposes of this opinion, we refer to all 
Greenlease and Greenville entities as “Greenlease.” 
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remediation costs.  After eight years of litigation, and having 
sorted through a century of historical records, the District 
Court allocated 62% of the total cleanup costs to Greenlease 
and the remainder to Trinity.  The parties filed cross-appeals 
challenging a number of the District Court’s rulings, including 
its ultimate allocation of cleanup costs.  For the reasons that 
follow, we will affirm the District Court’s pre-trial rulings on 
dispositive motions; we will vacate its cost allocation 
determination; and we will remand for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND2 
 
The site in question, known by the parties as the “North 
Plant,” is a tract of land that was used as a manufacturing site 
by a succession of companies.  Greenlease and Trinity also, at 
different times, operated facilities on a nearby tract of land 
called the “South Plant,” though that property does not figure 
prominently in this appeal.  Over time, the footprint of the 
North Plant grew from eleven to thirty-four acres.  That 
industrial development, as well as the many years of 
manufacturing activity that occurred there, resulted in multiple 
releases of hazardous materials – primarily lead – into the 
ground. 
  
A. The North Plant – 1898 to 1986 
 
From at least 1898 until sometime before Greenlease’s 
acquisition of the North Plant in 1910, Shelby Steel Tube 
                                              
 2  The facts recounted here are taken from the District 
Court’s post-trial findings of fact or from facts in the record 
that are undisputed. 
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Company owned and operated a steel tube factory on eleven 
acres of land that is now part of the North Plant.  Over the 
course of its ownership, Shelby Steel deposited historic fill as 
it was constructing its manufacturing facilities.  According to 
the District Court, “[h]istoric fill is ‘a soil mixed with various 
non-native materials, including construction demolition debris, 
concrete, asphalt, or it could be industrial materials such as slag 
or ash.’”  (App. at 186.)  Unfortunately, historic fill often 
contains lead and other contaminants.   
 
Greenlease began its manufacturing activities at the 
North Plant soon after acquiring the property.  Between 1911 
and 1922, it significantly expanded the North Plant to support 
its growing business of building and repairing railcars.  During 
that expansion, Greenlease used historic fill in the foundations 
supporting the new structures and rail lines.  Operations at the 
North Plant included two shops to paint the railcars, and 
Greenlease used a variety of toxic chemicals and lead paint 
during the painting process, without doing anything 
meaningful to collect or contain the runoff.   
 
B. Relationship Between Greenlease and Ampco 
 
In 1983, Ampco acquired Greenlease,3 but their 
relationship predated that acquisition.  They had had three 
overlapping board members since 1979 and continued to do so 
until 1986.  Other than those three shared board members and 
                                              
3  Greenlease’s stock was first acquired in 1937 by 
another company, the Pittsburgh Forging Co.  Ampco then 
acquired all of the stock of the Pittsburgh Forging Co., and, 
through a series of transactions, became the sole shareholder 
of Greenlease.   
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one shared officer, no other persons were employees of both 
Ampco and Greenlease.  Greenlease employees alone “were 
responsible for all day-to-day operations at the North Plant, 
including any waste disposal, waste handling, painting, 
abrasive blasting, welding, and fabrication operations.”  (App. 
at 81-82.)  Those employees coordinated disposal with outside 
contractors and communicated with the Pennsylvania 
Department of Environmental Protection (“PADEP”) on 
environmental matters.  Indeed, Ampco “did not employ any 
engineers or persons with technical experience in 
manufacturing that could make decisions for [Greenlease] with 
respect to environmental compliance or waste management.”  
(App. at 82.)  Instead, “Ampco employed only a professional 
staff, such as accountants, actuaries, and lawyers[.]”  (App. at 
82.)  Ampco did provide Greenlease with advice regarding the 
laws and regulations related to Greenlease’s waste generation, 
and Ampco monitored that waste generation.   
 
The cooperation between parent and subsidiary was 
complete enough that Greenlease adopted a resolution 
declaring that any action taken by Ampco that it “may think 
necessary and desirable to take on behalf of [Greenlease] shall 
be deemed to be the action of [Greenlease’s Board].”  (App. at 
72 (citation omitted).)  Ampco also asserted the right to 
approve Greenlease’s expenditures that exceeded a certain 
amount, though Greenlease was solely responsible for placing 
and paying any purchase orders.  In addition, Ampco provided 
certain services to Greenlease to minimize costs, including 
overseeing a single retirement plan and providing centralized 
financial planning and master insurance policies.   
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C. Trinity’s Acquisition of the North Plant 
  
 In 1986, Ampco authorized the Greenlease board of 
directors to sell the North Plant to Trinity.  The Purchase and 
Sale Agreement between Trinity and Greenlease (the 
“Agreement”) included a clause declaring that Greenlease 
“makes no representation or warranty regarding compliance 
with the Environmental Protection Act, any other 
environmental laws or regulations or any hazardous waste laws 
or regulations (collectively, ‘Environmental Laws’).”  (App. at 
199.)  Mutual indemnification provisions specific to 
environmental liabilities provided, in pertinent part: 
 
[Greenlease] agrees to indemnify and hold 
harmless [Trinity] against Damages arising out 
of or related to violations of Environmental 
Laws, which were caused by [Greenlease] or its 
predecessors in title to the assets at the [North 
Plant] on or prior to the date of Closing.  [Trinity] 
agrees to indemnify and hold harmless 
[Greenlease] against Damages arising out of or 
related to violations of Environmental Laws, 
which are caused by [Trinity] or its successors in 
title to the assets at the [North Plant] after the 
date of the Closing.  It is the intention of the 
parties that liability under this Section for any 
condition that is caused by the acts of 
[Greenlease] or its predecessors in title to the 
assets prior to the date of the Closing and by the 
acts of [Trinity] or its successors in title to the 
assets after the date of Closing shall be allocated 
between the parties in a just manner taking into 
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account degree of fault, period of violation and 
other relevant factors. 
 
(App. at 61 (some alterations in original).)  Those indemnities 
were stated to be effective for only three years after the closing 
of the property sale.  The Agreement further provided that 
Trinity “has not assumed, and expressly denies assumption 
hereby of, any other liability, obligation or commitment of 
[Greenlease] other than as set forth above or otherwise 
expressly set forth herein.”  (App. at 60-61 (alteration in 
original).)  Finally, a “[n]on-waiver of [r]emedies” clause in 
the Agreement provided that “[t]he rights and remedies herein 
provided are cumulative and are not exclusive of any rights or 
remedies which the parties hereto may otherwise have at law 
or in equity.”  (App. at 62.) 
 
Following the 1986 sale of the North Plant to Trinity, 
Greenlease continued to exist only as a “shell holding company 
without any [employees,] business activities, for profit 
activities, or other commercial undertakings[.]”  (App. at 89.)  
Its assets decreased at the end of each year following the sale 
of the North Plant, from about $51 million in 1987 to $658,594 
in 1990.  In the third and fourth years following the sale of the 
North Plant to Trinity, Greenlease issued dividends to Ampco, 
leaving Greenlease with only a $250,000 reserve for liabilities.  
At that time, Greenlease had no known liabilities beyond the 
reserve.  The executive vice president and chief administrative 
officer for Ampco, who was also an officer and director of 
Greenlease, stated that it was common for dividends to be 
made from a subsidiary to Ampco after an indemnification 
period ended.  An environmental reserve was placed on 
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Greenlease’s books when Trinity sued Greenlease and 
Ampco.4  
  
D. The North Plant – 1987 to 2004 
 
After purchasing the North Plant, Trinity continued the 
manufacture of railcars there.  In one of the paint shops, it 
installed concrete floors and used tar paper to capture paint 
drippage.  Beginning in late 1987, it implemented a policy 
preventing the use of metal-containing paints at the North 
Plant.  In 1994, Trinity removed the second paint shop, 
excavated the old dirt floors, and dumped the soil onto a field 
at the South Plant.  Trinity then erected a new paint shop at the 
North Plant.   
 
 Six years later, in 2000, Trinity ceased the North Plant 
operations.  It sold the property in 2004 to a third-party (the 
“Buyer”).  In connection with that sale, Trinity did not conduct 
an environmental assessment to determine whether the soil was 
contaminated, and it prohibited the Buyer from performing 
such testing without its consent.  The Buyer demolished almost 
all of the existing buildings at the North Plant to sell the scrap 
steel for profit.  Trinity maintains that, at some point, the Buyer 
dumped onto the North Plant property hazardous chemicals 
and waste that had been produced by the demolition of the 
North Plant buildings, exacerbating the pre-existing 
environmental harm.   
 
                                              
 4  In 2008, that reserve was $150,000, and in 2009, it 
was $282,500.   
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E. The Commonwealth’s Investigation and the 
Consent Decree 
In 2004, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and 
PADEP began an investigation into allegations that Trinity had 
improperly disposed of hazardous waste at the North Plant.  
The Commonwealth filed a criminal complaint against Trinity 
in 2006, raising three felony counts and eight misdemeanor 
counts related to the illegal handling and disposal of hazardous 
waste.  Trinity entered into a plea agreement with the 
Commonwealth that required the repayment of investigative 
costs, payment of a fine, contribution to a nonprofit 
organization, and, pursuant to a consent decree authorized by 
PADEP (the “Consent Decree”), the remediation of 
environmental contamination.  
 
 The Consent Decree stated that further investigation of 
the North Plant was “necessary to fully identify the nature and 
extent of the release of hazardous substances at and/or 
potentially migrating from the North Plant … and to determine 
the Response Actions necessary to remediate the hazardous 
substances at and/or potentially migrating from [the North] 
Plant.”  (App. at 513.)  The cleanup was governed by 
Pennsylvania’s Land Recycling and Environmental 
Remediation Standards Act, 35 Pa. Stat. § 6026.101 et seq., 
commonly known as “Act 2,” and the associated investigation 
was not limited to the time during which Trinity owned and 
operated the North Plant.   
 
 Trinity was on a short leash.  It was ordered to get 
approval from PADEP before it took any “significant step” 
pertaining to the property, and it was required to submit to 
PADEP “an investigation work plan, a supplemental 
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investigation work plan, a notice of intent to remediate, a 
remedial investigation report, a proposed cleanup work plan, a 
supplemental cleanup work plan, and a final report.”  (App. at 
213-14.)  Those additional mandates increased the difficulty 
and expense of the remediation project.  The remediation 
efforts were also affected by the fact that “[t]he North Plant 
was a ‘high profile, high visibility location’” and is bordered 
by residential communities on three sides.  (App. at 218 
(citation omitted).) 
 
 PADEP approved Trinity’s remedial investigation work 
plan in 2007.  Trinity later sent Greenlease a pre-suit notice 
describing the contamination and its legal position that 
Greenlease had contributed to the pollution.   
 
F. Trinity’s Cleanup of the North Plant 
 
  To perform the necessary cleanup, Trinity had to buy 
back the North Plant.  It then selected Golder Associates, Inc. 
(“Golder”) to perform, direct, and supervise the cleanup 
operations.  PADEP approved that selection.  Trinity did not 
employ a competitive bidding process to select Golder because 
it had been impressed by Golder’s cleanup operations at 
several other sites and because the Consent Decree’s deadlines 
created an urgency to get a remediation consultant in place as 
soon as possible.  Trinity and Golder agreed to an “open 
billing” process that provided Golder would be paid only for 
the work it ultimately needed to perform.  (App. at 218-19.)  
Billing was on a “cost plus 10 percent” basis, which gave 
Golder a ten percent markup on the expenses it incurred.  (App. 
at 219.) 
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 Golder’s cleanup efforts required it to first identify 
areas of the property that were of concern.  It analyzed 
available historical information concerning construction and 
manufacturing activities that had taken place at the North 
Plant.  It then conducted soil sampling to further identify areas 
requiring remediation.  Golder ultimately divided the North 
Plant into twenty impact areas that required remediation.  
Thirteen of the twenty impact areas were primarily 
contaminated by lead.  The remaining impact areas were 
primarily contaminated by volatile and semi-volatile organic 
compounds and a variety of other hazardous substances.  Major 
remediation activities included excavating contaminated soil, 
refilling excavated areas with clean material, chemically 
treating contaminated soil, transporting excavated soil to 
appropriate landfills, and placing asphalt caps over parts of the 
North Plant.  In total, Golder disposed of approximately 39,000 
tons of soil off-site and capped about 15,000 tons of soil with 
asphalt.   
 
 Those efforts cost nearly $9,000,000 and made the 
property usable again.  Parts of the North Plant with asphalt 
caps are suitable for use as a parking lot.  Other areas are 
suitable for industrial or commercial use.  There is ongoing 
work at the North Plant to ensure that the safety mechanisms 
created as part of the environmental remediation continue to 
function.5   
 
 
 
                                              
 5  According to the District Court’s findings of fact, the 
work includes maintaining the asphalt caps and continued 
ground water monitoring.   
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II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
Invoking federal and state laws, Trinity filed a 
complaint against Greenlease and Ampco in 2008 to defray the 
North Plant remediation costs.  More specifically, Trinity 
sought cost recovery under CERCLA pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9607, cost recovery under the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act (“RCRA”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 
§ 6972(a)(1)(B), and contribution under CERCLA pursuant to 
42 U.S.C. §§ 9613(f)(1) and 9613(f)(3)(B).  It also brought cost 
recovery and contribution claims under the HSCA, as well as 
state common law claims for contribution and negligence per 
se.   
 
A. Pre-Trial Motions and Rulings 
 
Trinity’s claims against Ampco were premised on 
Ampco’s alleged direct or derivative liability for Greenlease’s 
conduct at the North Plant.  Upon cross motions for summary 
judgment on that issue, the District Court concluded that 
Ampco was not directly or derivatively liable for pollution at 
the North Plant.   
 
Greenlease also moved for judgment on the pleadings, 
arguing that Trinity’s claims were barred by the 
indemnification provisions of their Agreement.  It claimed that 
once the mutual indemnities expired, neither party was entitled 
to seek compensation from the other.  The District Court 
rejected that argument, ruling that the existence and expiration 
of the indemnification provisions did not prevent Trinity from 
seeking other remedies available at law or in equity.   
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Greenlease and Trinity later filed cross motions for 
summary judgment on Trinity’s CERCLA, RCRA, HSCA, and 
common law claims.  The District Court granted partial 
summary judgment for Trinity, holding as a matter of law that 
Greenlease was a potentially responsible person under 
CERCLA and the HSCA.  It also granted Greenlease’s cross-
motion in part, granting it summary judgment on all of 
Trinity’s claims other than those for contribution under 42 
U.S.C. § 9613(f)(3)(B) and 35 Pa. Stat. § 6020.705(c)(2).  The 
litigation proceeded to a bench trial to determine the equitable 
allocation of cleanup costs between the parties.   
 
Prior to trial, Trinity tried to recoup costs associated 
with its cleanup of the South Plant, but the District Court 
concluded that Trinity was not entitled to those costs because 
Greenlease had never owned or operated that property or 
disposed of any hazardous waste at the South Plant.   
 
B. The Parties’ Cost Allocation Proposals 
  
 Trinity’s and Greenlease’s experts each provided the 
District Court with a proposal for the equitable allocation of 
cleanup costs between the parties.  Trinity’s expert, Joseph B. 
Gormley, Jr., relied on available historical information to 
identify three sources of contamination at the North Plant: 
volatile chemicals used in manufacturing operations; general 
dispersions caused by painting; and historic fill used for 
construction.  He then employed that same historical 
information to assign each party a percentage of responsibility 
for the contamination found within each impact area.  Next, 
Gormley analyzed the major remediation activities and 
associated costs required to clean up each impact area.  To 
arrive at a total cost allocation for the major remediation 
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activities, he multiplied the percentage of responsibility for 
each specific impact area by the major remediation activity 
costs in that specific area and added those results together.  
That produced an overall percentage allocation.  Gormley 
applied that same overall percentage to general project costs 
not tied to any specific impact area.  Ultimately, he allocated 
99% of the costs to Greenlease and 1% to Trinity.   
 
 Not surprisingly, Greenlease’s expert, Steven Gerritsen, 
proposed a very different cost allocation.  He concluded that 
most of the lead present at the North Plant was caused by the 
use of historic fill rather than Greenlease’s operations at the 
facility.  He calculated that Greenlease was responsible for 
depositing fill on only 2.8 acres of the thirty-four acre North 
Plant.  He opined that the rest of the fill predated Greenlease’s 
purchase of the property and was thus not Greenlease’s 
responsibility.  Gerristen also suggested that much of Golder’s 
work was unreasonable and unnecessary and thus that Trinity 
had spent more money than it should have to perform the 
cleanup.  Gerristen ultimately concluded that Greenlease 
should be allocated only 12-13% of the cleanup costs.   
 
C. The District Court’s Cost Allocation Opinion 
 
In an admirably thorough opinion, the District Court 
endeavored to make sense of the extensive record, including 
the competing expert contentions.  It first concluded that 
Greenlease was not responsible for any of the contamination 
attributable to Shelby Steel or any other non-party because 
Trinity had failed to show that those parties were “unknown, 
insolvent, or otherwise immune from suit.”6  (App. at 351.)  
                                              
6 A court may equitably allocate among the parties 
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The Court, however, rejected Greenlease’s contention that 
Golder incurred unreasonable or excessive costs when 
performing its cleanup at the North Plant.   
 
To assign each party a percentage of responsibility for 
the contamination within each impact area, the District Court 
relied heavily on historic maps and schematics of the North 
Plant.  For many impact areas, the Court agreed with 
Greenlease that the lead contamination could be attributed 
solely to Shelby Steel’s use of historic fill, and therefore should 
not be a source of liability for Greenlease.  For other impact 
areas, the Court found that Greenlease was responsible for the 
deposit of historic fill, or was solely responsible for the use of 
volatile chemicals, and that Greenlease should thus bear full 
responsibility for the pollution.  For the remaining impact 
areas, the District Court split responsibility between the parties 
based on the number of years that each had owned the property 
or on various other considerations such as known use of a 
specific chemical contaminant.   
 
After determining the percentages of responsibility 
within each impact area, the District Court considered the 
major remediation activities that took place in each impact area 
                                              
before it the share of hazardous waste contamination belonging 
to responsible third-party entities not before it (such allocated 
amounts being known as “orphan shares”).  But it can typically 
only do so if such orphan shares belong to entities that are 
unknown, insolvent, or immune from suit.  See Litgo N.J. Inc. 
v. Comm’r N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 725 F.3d 369, 380 n.4 (3d 
Cir. 2013) (permitting equitable allocation of orphan shares 
among liable parties at the court’s discretion).  As found by the 
District Court, that is not the case here.   
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to determine an overall allocation of cost.  Though it purported 
to follow Gormley’s methodology, the Court departed from it 
in an important respect: Gormley’s methodology accounted for 
the fact that different remediation activities cost different 
amounts of money, whereas the District Court’s methodology 
did not.  To arrive at its cost allocation, the Court multiplied 
the percentage of responsibility it attributed to Greenlease by 
the square footage or cubic yardage involved in each 
remediation activity.  The District Court then added the results 
and divided by the total square footage and cubic yardage for 
all remediation activities at the North Plant to arrive at the 
overall cost allocation percentage.  By those calculations, it 
concluded that Greenlease was responsible for 83% of the total 
costs, while Trinity was responsible for 17%.   
 
 The District Court then considered a variety of equitable 
factors to ensure the fairness of the overall cost allocation.  It 
ultimately reduced Greenlease’s percentage of responsibility, 
based on three equitable factors. 
 
First, it found that at least a portion of Trinity’s 
remediation costs were attributable to the actions of the third-
party Buyer and, in particular, the Buyer’s decision to demolish 
buildings at the North Plant.  The Court said that Trinity failed 
to “specify the amount of response costs it incurred to 
remediate the waste left at the North Plant by [the Buyer].”  
(App. at 380.)  Therefore, “there [was] an equitable need to 
reduce Greenlease’s percentage of responsibility for response 
costs to reflect an amount attributable to [the Buyer].”  (App. 
at 380.)  Accordingly, the Court reduced Greenlease’s 
responsibility by 6%.   
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Second, it concluded that the existence of the 
indemnification provisions demonstrated the parties’ intent to 
shift liability, so it further reduced Greenlease’s share of 
responsibility by 5%.   
 
Third, it recognized that the property value of the North 
Plant had increased as a result of remediation since the land 
was now suitable for some commercial or industrial uses.  The 
Court concluded that an additional 10% reduction in 
Greenlease’s responsibility was appropriate to account for that 
increased market value that would inhere to Trinity.   
 
After accounting for those equitable deductions, the 
District Court determined that Greenlease was responsible for 
62% of “all response costs incurred by … Trinity … for the 
cleanup at the North Plant[.]”  (App. at 388-89.) 
 
III. DISCUSSION7 
 
A. Statutory Background 
 
Congress enacted CERCLA in 1980 “to promote the 
timely cleanup of hazardous waste sites and to ensure that the 
costs of such cleanup efforts were borne by those responsible 
for the contamination.”  Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. 
United States, 556 U.S. 599, 602 (2009) (internal quotation 
                                              
7  The District Court had jurisdiction over Trinity’s 
federal law claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 6972(a) and 9613(b) and 
28 U.S.C. § 1331.  It had supplemental jurisdiction over 
Trinity’s state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.  We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 
19 
 
marks and citation omitted).  Under CERCLA, a party who has 
paid for environmental remediation may seek to hold other 
potentially responsible parties (“PRPs”) liable through the cost 
recovery mechanisms of § 107(a) or the contribution 
mechanisms of § 113(f) of that statute.8  Agere Sys., Inc. v. 
Advanced Envtl. Tech. Corp., 602 F.3d 204, 216-18 (3d Cir. 
2010).  The remedies under those two provisions are distinct.  
Id. at 217 (citing United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 551 U.S. 
128, 138 (2007)).  While § 107(a) authorizes complete cost 
recovery under a joint and several liability theory, § 113(f) 
permits a party to seek contribution from other PRPs following 
a CERCLA suit brought by a governmental authority against 
that first party, or after that party has resolved its “liability to 
the United States or an individual State through an 
administratively or judicially approved settlement.”  Id.  
Pennsylvania, meanwhile, enacted the HSCA in 1988 to 
provide additional statutory tools to deal with the improper 
disposal of hazardous waste within the Commonwealth.  35 Pa. 
Stat. § 6020.102; Gen. Elec. Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. Envirotech 
Corp., 763 F. Supp. 113, 115 (M.D. Pa. 1991). 
 
Although Trinity initially sought both cost recovery and 
contribution from Greenlease, the only claims remaining on 
appeal are claims for contribution pursuant to CERCLA 
subsection § 113(f)(3)(B), and the analogous section of the 
HSCA, 35 Pa. Stat. § 6020.705(c)(2).  See also Trinity Indus., 
Inc. v. Chi. Bridge & Iron Co., 735 F.3d 131, 136 (3d Cir. 
2013) (holding that a party who enters into a consent decree 
under state law is entitled to seek contribution under 
§ 113(f)(3)(B)).  Because a party’s “liability under the HSCA 
                                              
 8  As cited earlier, those sections of CERCLA are 
codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a) and 9613(f), respectively. 
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mirrors liability under CERCLA” and “the cost recovery and 
contribution provisions in HSCA are virtually identical to 
those in CERCLA,” Agere Sys., Inc., 602 F.3d at 236, our 
resolution of Trinity’s claim for contribution under CERCLA 
is determinative of its companion HSCA claim. 
 
B. Greenlease’s Appeal 
 
Greenlease raises three primary issues on appeal.  First, 
it appeals the District Court’s determination that the 
indemnification provisions of the Agreement between it and 
Trinity do not preclude Trinity from seeking contribution.  We 
will affirm because the language of the Agreement better 
supports the District Court’s conclusion.  Second, Greenlease 
appeals the ruling that the costs Trinity and Golder incurred in 
cleaning up the North Plant were all necessary and reasonable 
under CERCLA.  We will affirm because those costs have the 
requisite nexus to remedying environmental harm at the North 
Plant and because the record does not support Greenlease’s 
contention that Trinity incurred excessive costs.  Third, 
Greenlease challenges the overall cost allocation ordered by 
the District Court.  We agree with Greenlease that the Court’s 
cost allocation analysis was flawed, and we will therefore 
vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings. 
 
1. The Agreement’s Indemnification Provisions 
Do Not Preclude Trinity from Seeking 
Contribution from Greenlease. 
 Greenlease argues that, at the conclusion of the three-
year mutual indemnification period stated in its Agreement 
with Trinity, the parties were released from any subsequent 
statutory or common law responsibility to one another.  
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Greenlease thus asserts that it was error to deny its motion for 
judgment on the pleadings.  Our review of a motion for 
judgment on the pleadings is plenary.  Caprio v. Healthcare 
Revenue Recovery Grp., LLC, 709 F.3d 142, 146 (3d Cir. 
2013).  Such a motion should not be granted unless the moving 
party has established that there is no material issue of fact to 
resolve, and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  
Rosenau v. Unifund Corp., 539 F.3d 218, 221 (3d Cir. 2008).  
We also exercise plenary review over questions of contract 
interpretation.  Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Norwin Sch. Dist., 544 
F.3d 229, 243 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 
 CERCLA allows parties to utilize indemnification 
agreements “to shift the ultimate financial loss” for 
environmental cleanup costs.  Hatco Corp. v. W.R. Grace & 
Co. Conn., 59 F.3d 400, 404 (3d Cir. 1995).  The statute says 
plainly that it does not “bar any agreement to insure, hold 
harmless, or indemnify a party to such agreement for any 
liability under this section.”  42 U.S.C. § 9607(e)(1).  Whether 
the expiration of the indemnification provisions at issue here 
effectively shifted all financial burden for CERCLA cleanup 
costs to Trinity thus turns on the proper interpretation of the 
Agreement.  “[A]greements among private parties … 
addressing the allocation of responsibility for CERCLA claims 
are to be interpreted by incorporating state … law.”  Hatco, 59 
F.3d at 405.  Here, that means Pennsylvania law. 
 
When a contract is clear and unambiguous, 
Pennsylvania binds the parties to the intent contained within 
the writing itself.  Wert v. Manorcare of Carlisle PA, LLC, 124 
A.3d 1248, 1259 (Pa. 2015).  “The whole instrument must be 
taken together in arriving at contractual intent.”  Great Am. 
Ins., 544 F.3d at 243 (quoting Murphy v. Duquesne Univ. of the 
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Holy Ghost, 777 A.2d 418, 429 (Pa. 2001)).  Courts are not to 
interpret one provision of the contract in a way that annuls a 
different provision of it, Capek v. Devito, 767 A.2d 1047, 1050 
(Pa. 2001), and “when specific or exact provisions seem to 
conflict with broader or more general terms, the specific 
provisions are more likely to reflect the intent of the parties[,]” 
Musko v. Musko, 697 A.2d 255, 256 (Pa. 1997).  Those 
interpretive rules lead us to conclude that the Agreement at 
issue reserved Trinity’s right to seek contribution from 
Greenlease for environmental cleanup costs. 
 
The Agreement’s indemnification provisions stated, in 
relevant part, that each party indemnified the other for any 
“[d]amages arising out of or related to violations of 
Environmental Laws” and that liability for any such violations 
would be “allocated between the [parties] in a just manner 
taking into account degree of fault, period of violation and 
other relevant factors.”  (App. at 599-600.)  It is true that the 
mutual indemnification expired after three years.  The 
Agreement did not, however, contain language expressing the 
parties’ intent that Trinity would assume all of Greenlease’s 
obligations and liabilities after that three-year period.  Rather, 
the Agreement contained explicit “non-assumption of 
liabilities” and “non-waiver of remedies” clauses.  The “non-
assumption of liabilities” clause provided that Trinity “has not 
assumed, and expressly denies assumption hereby of, any other 
liability, obligation or commitment of [Greenlease] other than 
as set forth above or otherwise expressly set forth herein.”  
(App. at 567.)  It is reading far too much into the words “any 
other liability” to think they meant that the prominent risk of 
environmental liability was the one thing the parties meant for 
Trinity to be stuck with.  Moreover, the “non-waiver of 
remedies” clause plainly provided that “[t]he rights and 
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remedies herein provided are cumulative and are not exclusive 
of any rights or remedies which the parties hereto may 
otherwise have at law or in equity.”  (App. at 612-13.)  The 
express language of the contract, therefore, provides both that 
Trinity did not assume any of Greenlease’s liabilities or 
obligations following the three-year mutual indemnification 
period, and that Trinity did not waive its statutory rights under 
CERCLA and the HSCA to seek contribution from Greenlease.  
In short, while the contractual right to indemnification ended, 
all other rights remained. 
 
Greenlease’s three primary arguments to the contrary do 
not persuade us.  First, Greenlease argues that the 
indemnification provision should control our interpretation of 
the entire Agreement because it is more specific than the “non-
waiver of remedies” clause.  That reasoning, however, puts too 
high a premium on specificity.  Yes, the contractual indemnity 
is specific.  But the non-assumption of liabilities and non-
waiver of remedies provisions are plain enough for us to 
discern the intent of the parties, and that intent was to preserve 
non-contractual rights.  Besides, there is a sense in which the 
indemnification language is not more specific than the other 
relevant provisions: it does not address the parties’ liabilities 
after the first three years following the sale.  The “non-
assumption of liabilities” and “non-waiver of remedies” 
clauses do.  They are not time limited and therefore can be 
understood as specifically addressing the time period after the 
expiration of the contractual indemnities.  We will not construe 
the indemnification provision to cover time periods that, by the 
plain language of the contract, it does not cover.  See Jacobs 
Constructors, Inc. v. NPS Energy Servs., Inc., 264 F.3d 365, 
373 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[B]ecause the nature and purpose of any 
indemnity agreement involves the shifting and voluntary 
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assumption of legal obligations, they are to be narrowly 
construed.”). 
 
Second, Greenlease argues that allowing Trinity to seek 
contribution against it pursuant to the “non-waiver of 
remedies” clause “renders the environmental indemnity 
provision meaningless[.]”  (Green. Opening Br. at 36.)  But 
that argument again ignores the critical fact that the parties, by 
agreeing to the three-year mutual indemnification provision, 
granted to each other certain contractual rights separate and 
distinct from any statutory, legal, or equitable rights or 
remedies.  The “non-waiver of remedies” clause is perfectly 
clear in that regard, reserving to both parties “any rights or 
remedies which the parties … may otherwise have at law or in 
equity.”  (App. at 613.)  As the District Court concluded, the 
contractual remedies created by the indemnification provision 
were, by the terms of the Agreement, “cumulative” and not 
“exclusive” of the remedies available at law or in equity.  (App. 
at 66, 613.)  Greenlease could have bargained for a provision 
in the Agreement whereby Trinity would have assumed all of 
Greenlease’s obligations and liabilities following the 
expiration of the three-year indemnification provision.  But it 
did not. 
 
Third, Greenlease relies on Keywell Corporation v. 
Weinstein, 33 F.3d 159 (2d Cir. 1994), a decision by the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, to argue that 
all CERCLA and HSCA liability automatically transferred to 
Trinity after the expiration of the three-year mutual 
indemnification provision.  There are, though, important 
differences between the contract at issue in Keywell and the 
Agreement here that are sufficient to make that case inapposite.  
The corporate plaintiff in Keywell sought to recover CERCLA 
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cleanup costs from two individual defendants, who had been 
officers of the corporation that sold the relevant piece of land 
to the plaintiff.  Id. at 160.  The purchase agreement for the 
land included a two-year indemnification provision 
guaranteeing to hold the plaintiff harmless for any damages 
arising out of “any breach of warranty or representation” by the 
selling entity “or its management stockholders” and for “any 
liabilities or obligations of [s]eller” not explicitly listed in the 
purchase agreement.  Id. at 162.  The plaintiff then entered into 
a separate thirty-year indemnification agreement with the 
corporate seller that guaranteed to hold the plaintiff harmless 
for any damages that “arose or existed” prior to the purchase 
agreement.  Id.  Importantly, that thirty-year indemnification 
agreement stated that only the corporate entity would be held 
to the longer indemnification period, not its individual officers.  
Id.  Furthermore, prior to seeking to recover CERCLA cleanup 
costs from the individual defendants, the plaintiff had entered 
into yet another contract, this last one “unconditionally 
releas[ing]” the corporate entity’s former “Management 
Group,” which included the individual defendants, from any 
claims the plaintiff might have had under the purchase 
agreement.  Id.  On that set of facts, the Second Circuit held 
that the plaintiff could not recover CERCLA cleanup costs 
from the individual defendants because the relevant contractual 
documents unequivocally expressed the parties’ intent to shift 
any and all liability away from the individual officers of the 
corporate entity after the initial two-year indemnification 
period.  Id. at 166. 
 
In contrast, the Agreement between Trinity and 
Greenlease does not demonstrate an unequivocal intent to shift 
liability away from Greenlease after the three-year contractual 
indemnification period expired.  On the contrary, rather than 
26 
 
releasing Greenlease from liability, the Agreement states that 
Trinity did not assume any of Greenlease’s liabilities or 
obligations, unless otherwise expressly provided by the 
Agreement.  Greenlease’s reliance on Keywell is therefore 
misplaced, and we will affirm the denial of its motion for 
judgment on the pleadings. 
 
2. The Costs Trinity Incurred Were 
 Necessary and Reasonable. 
 
Greenlease next argues that the District Court 
impermissibly allocated to it costs that Trinity unnecessarily 
incurred by failing to impose cost controls on the remediation 
work at the North Plant.  We review the District Court’s factual 
findings for clear error, but review de novo its interpretation of 
CERCLA.  Agere Sys., Inc., 602 F.3d at 216. 
 
A plaintiff can obtain contribution from a PRP under 
§ 113(f)(3)(B) of CERCLA only if it first demonstrates a prima 
facie case of liability under § 107(a).  See N.J. Tpk. Auth. v. 
PPG Indus., Inc., 197 F.3d 96, 104 (3d Cir. 1999).  Here, that 
requires Trinity to demonstrate the following: first, that the 
North Plant is a facility; second, that Greenlease is a PRP; 
third, that “the release or threatened release of a hazardous 
substance has occurred”; and fourth, that Trinity incurred 
“necessary response costs consistent with the [National 
Contingency Plan.]”9  Chevron Mining Inc. v. United States, 
                                              
 9  The National Contingency Plan provides a set of 
standards governing environmental cleanup activities, 
including “‘methods and criteria for determining the 
appropriate extent of removal, remedy, and other measures,’ 
42 U.S.C. § 9605(a)(3), and ‘means of assuring that remedial 
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863 F.3d 1261, 1269 (10th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks 
and citation omitted).  Greenlease does not dispute the District 
Court’s conclusions on the first three points.  It only argues that 
the District Court erred by determining, as a legal matter, that 
Trinity’s response costs were per se necessary because they 
were undertaken in compliance with the Consent Decree.  That 
argument, however, even if it had merit, is irrelevant, since the 
record is clear that Trinity’s response costs were in fact 
necessary under CERCLA.  We thus need not address whether 
response costs undertaken in compliance with a consent decree 
should be considered necessary per se. 
 
A cost is considered “necessary” and hence subject to 
shared liability if there is “some nexus between [it] and an 
actual effort to respond to environmental contamination.”10  
                                              
action measures are cost-effective.’  [42 U.S.C.] § 9605(a)(7).”  
United States v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co. Inc., 432 F.3d 
161, 168 (3d Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
 10  The case law that has developed around CERCLA 
has interpreted the term “necessary” to refer to a more elastic 
concept than how the word is typically understood.  For 
example, CERCLA case law defines a “necessary” cost as one 
that has some “nexus” to the cleanup of environmental harm, 
not as a cost without which the cleanup would not have been 
possible.  Compare Young v. United States, 394 F.3d 858, 863 
(10th Cir. 2005) (interpreting the term “necessary cost” in the 
CERCLA context to refer to a cost that has a “nexus” to an 
environmental cleanup), with NECESSARY, Black’s Law 
Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (defining “necessary” as something 
“[t]hat is needed for some purpose or reason; essential”).  We 
have undertaken our analysis of what costs were or were not 
necessary in this case in light of CERCLA precedent.  Our 
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Young v. United States, 394 F.3d 858, 863 (10th Cir. 2005); cf. 
Black Horse Lane Assoc., L.P. v. Dow Chem. Corp., 228 F.3d 
275, 297 (3d Cir. 2000) (determining that a plaintiff did not 
meet its burden to demonstrate the necessity of a response 
action because it “did not relate to any remedial or response 
action at the” relevant site).  It must be, in other words, a 
response cost, and CERCLA broadly defines a “response” to a 
hazardous release to include a wide variety of investigative, 
removal, and remedial actions.  See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23)-(25) 
(providing a non-exhaustive list of “response” actions); W.R. 
Grace & Co.-Conn. v. Zotos Int’l, Inc., 559 F.3d 85, 92 (2d Cir. 
2009) (noting that “response costs are liberally construed under 
CERCLA”).  The District Court’s detailed factual findings 
make clear that there was a nexus between the costs Trinity 
incurred and its effort to investigate and remediate the 
contamination at the North Plant. 
 
The cleanup activities at the North Plant were guided by 
the Consent Decree’s requirement that those efforts be 
undertaken pursuant to the dictates of Pennsylvania’s Act 2.  
That statute requires that remediation activities meet one of 
three standards: a background standard comparing 
contaminated areas to unaffected areas; a uniform statewide 
health standard set by a state agency, which differs depending 
on whether the site is meant for residential or commercial use; 
or a site-specific standard “based on a site-specific risk 
assessment so that any substantial present or probable future 
risk to human health and the environment is eliminated or 
reduced” so that the site could be utilized in accordance with 
its “present or currently planned future use[.]”  (App. at 212 
                                              
opinion does not address how the term “necessary” should be 
interpreted in contexts outside of CERCLA. 
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(citing 35 Pa. Stat. § 6026.301(a)).)  Trinity used the statewide 
health standard to determine which areas required “some type 
of response action” and then used the site-specific standard to 
guide the actual “soil cleanup.”11  (App. at 223.)  It did not use 
the background standard.   
 
During the investigation phase of Trinity’s cleanup 
activities, its consultant Golder used soil sampling to determine 
the areas of concern requiring remediation.  That necessitated 
the establishment of a “standard action level,” which is the 
numerical threshold for determining when soil is contaminated 
to an extent requiring treatment.  For example, to determine 
whether areas contaminated by lead – the primary contaminant 
of concern – required treatment, Golder originally selected a 
standard action level of 1000 milligrams of lead per kilogram 
of soil.  That was not a random choice.  It selected that standard 
because it had observed that, at a threshold level of 1500 
mg/kg, some soil samples passed toxicity testing, while others 
failed.  At the more exacting 1000 mg/kg level, Golder was 
confident that it would catch all of the soil requiring 
remediation. 
 
But Golder was also cost conscious on that point.  The 
selection of an accurate standard was important because failure 
to adequately remove all of the contaminated soil would 
require Golder to put in place more costly hazardous waste 
caps that could leave the land unusable.  It initially chose the 
1000 mg/kg standard for the reasons just noted, but when, 
during the cleanup process, it discovered that a significant 
                                              
11  The site-specific standard also required Trinity and 
Golder to engage the local community and to accept public 
comments about the cleanup efforts.   
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amount of soil exceeded the 1000 mg/kg standard yet could 
still safely remain in place because it was going to “be capped 
anyway as part of the approved remedy” (App. at 234), it 
conducted a “site characterization study” to determine whether 
there was a more appropriate standard action level (App. at 
234-35).  Golder settled on a 2500 parts per million standard 
that was approved by PADEP.  The record accordingly 
establishes an appropriate cost sensitivity and a nexus between 
Golder’s (and hence Trinity’s) investigative efforts and the 
purpose of remedying environmental harms.   
 
The same is true with regard to the activities Golder 
undertook to remediate the contaminated areas.  It used three 
primary response actions: first, simply consolidating 
contaminated soil and placing an asphalt cap atop that soil; 
second, excavating and chemically treating contaminated soil 
to render it nonhazardous and then placing an asphalt cap over 
the remediated area; and third, transporting contaminated soil 
to an appropriate landfill.12  Golder’s soil excavation efforts 
allowed it to use simple asphalt caps to cover the excavated 
areas, as opposed to what are called Subtitle C caps.  Subtitle 
C of RCRA regulates the precise manner in which a hazardous 
waste cap is put in place and maintained.  Installing and 
maintaining a cap in compliance with Subtitle C is more 
                                              
12  Certain contaminated soil was amenable to chemical 
treatment that rendered it nonhazardous; other soil was not 
amenable to such treatment and remained hazardous prior to 
disposal.  The soil that was chemically treated could be 
transported to a nonhazardous waste landfill, which was two to 
four times cheaper than disposal at a hazardous waste landfill.  
The soil remaining hazardous had to be transported to a 
hazardous waste landfill.   
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difficult, complex, and expensive than installing and 
maintaining a simple asphalt cap.  The District Court found that 
use of a Subtitle C cap would have made the North Plant site 
look like a “landfill,” would not have been “consistent with the 
residential character of Greenville,” (App. at 241), and would 
have rendered much of the North Plant unusable for any 
purpose.  Those factual findings reinforce that Golder’s 
activities had the required nexus to the stated purpose of 
remedying environmental harms.  The response costs Trinity 
incurred were therefore necessary under CERCLA. 
 
Although Greenlease is correct that “[t]he cleanup at the 
North Plant was more difficult, inclusive, and expensive 
because it was done pursuant to the consent order and with 
oversight by … PADEP,” (App. at 225), we do not agree that 
those extra costs were consequently unnecessary.  The Consent 
Decree required compliance with state environmental 
standards.  To ensure that those statutory requirements were 
met, Trinity and Golder had to get PADEP’s approval for each 
step of the cleanup.  The costs incurred to comply with the 
Consent Decree were thus aimed directly at satisfying state 
environmental standards and are appropriately classified as 
“necessary to the containment and cleanup of hazardous 
releases.”  Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v. Dep’t of Army of U.S., 
55 F.3d 827, 850 (3d Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). 
 
A clearer way to understand Greenlease’s contentions is 
to see them as challenging the reasonableness of Trinity’s 
expenditures, not their necessity.  Greenlease does not point to 
any specific activity that was not “necessary.”  Rather, it 
complains that Trinity incurred excessive costs because the 
Consent Decree lacked meaningful cost control mechanisms, 
because Trinity hired Golder without competitive bidding, and 
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because Trinity agreed to a “cost-plus” billing arrangement 
with Golder.  Those arguments fare poorly precisely because 
they do not address necessity, as that concept is applied in the 
context of CERCLA. 
 
Greenlease’s arguments fall flat in light of the District 
Court’s factual findings that we have already recounted in 
some detail.  Greenlease does not point to any record evidence 
demonstrating how any of those facts resulted in unreasonably 
excessive spending.  In contrast, as the Court found, Trinity 
and Golder worked together “to try to control costs or pay only 
reasonable costs,” (App. at 218), and worked with PADEP “to 
reduce the amount of work [Trinity] had to do to comply with 
the” Consent Decree (App. at 225).  The District Court credited 
expert testimony that the billing methods used by Trinity 
“contributed to the cost efficiency of the response work at the 
North Plant” and “prevented Golder from up-charging 
[Trinity.]”  (App. at 219-20.)  Greenlease has given us no sound 
reason to disagree with that assessment.13 
                                              
 13  Even if Greenlease’s argument had merit, and the 
matter were in equipoise, we might yet be inclined to affirm 
the District Court’s finding that the costs Trinity incurred were 
reasonable.  That is because Trinity incurred those costs in 
furtherance of the Consent Decree.  Although we need not, and 
do not, decide here whether costs incurred by a private party in 
compliance with a state consent decree are presumed 
reasonable under CERCLA, we note that similar costs incurred 
by a government party are presumed reasonable.  For example, 
it is black letter CERCLA law that when a government’s 
actions are not inconsistent with the National Contingency 
Plan, its costs are presumed reasonable, E.I. Dupont, 432 F.3d 
at 178, and are recoverable against PRPs, 42 U.S.C. 
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 We will therefore affirm the District Court’s 
determination that Trinity’s response costs were necessary and 
reasonable. 
 
3. The District Court Erred in Allocating Costs 
Between Trinity and Greenlease. 
 
 Greenlease argues that the District Court used a purely 
speculative methodology, different from the methodology 
proposed by Trinity’s expert witness Gormley to allocate costs 
between the parties.14  In particular, the criticism is that the 
District Court relied on “volumes and surface areas … as a 
proxy for the costs Trinity incurred at each impact area[.]”  
(Green. Opening Br. at 22.)  Greenlease contends that that 
methodology was arbitrary because it failed to account for the 
reality that different units of measure are not interchangeable 
and because volumetric data cannot reliably serve as a proxy 
for costs when some remediation activities cost more than 
                                              
§ 9607(a)(4)(A).  Since compliance with a consent decree 
entered pursuant to state law “establishe[s] … compliance with 
the National Contingency Plan,” Niagara Mohawk Power 
Corp. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 596 F.3d 112, 137 (2d Cir. 
2010), costs incurred by a government party in compliance 
with such a decree should be presumed reasonable.  There may 
be a related principle warranting a similar presumption in a 
context like this. 
 
14  Greenlease’s expert incorporated Gormley’s cost 
allocation methodology into his own cost allocation analysis, 
so Gormley’s methodology was the only one presented to the 
District Court. 
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others.  According to Greenlease, the District Court was forced 
to resort to a methodology based on volumetric data alone 
because Trinity failed to present sufficient evidence 
documenting how much it cost to undertake each of the major 
remediation activities within each impact area.  Greenlease’s 
position is thus that the District Court’s cost allocation 
methodology cannot stand, given the Court’s failure to include 
actual costs in its analysis.  We agree that the Court materially 
deviated from the methodology presented by Gormley and so 
arrived at a speculative cost allocation methodology that must 
be corrected. 
 
CERCLA provides PRPs with a right to contribution for 
remediation expenses.  Atl. Research Corp., 551 U.S. at 138.  
A district court “may allocate response costs among liable 
parties using such equitable factors as the court determines are 
appropriate.”  42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1).  “[T]he law does not 
command mathematical preciseness from the evidence in 
finding damages.  Instead, all that is required is that sufficient 
facts ... be introduced so that a court can arrive at an intelligent 
estimate without speculation or conjecture.”  Scully v. US 
WATS, Inc., 238 F.3d 497, 515 (3d Cir. 2001) (alterations in 
original) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  We 
review an allocation of CERCLA damages for abuse of 
discretion.  Agere Sys., Inc., 602 F.3d at 216.  A district court 
abuses its discretion when its decision depends “upon a clearly 
erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law or an 
improper application of law to fact.”  Id. (citation omitted). 
 
 The parties and their experts in this case placed the 
District Court in an unenviable position.  Each of the parties 
staked out extreme positions on cost allocation, with Trinity’s 
expert Gormley opining that Greenlease should be held 
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responsible for 99% of all cleanup costs and Greenlease’s 
expert opining that, despite Greenlease’s 76 years of building 
and manufacturing activity at the North Plant, Trinity should 
be held responsible for nearly 90% of all cleanup costs.  The 
record became even more difficult to sort out when, on direct 
examination, Gormley gave testimony that was unclear at best 
and departed from the methodology contained in his expert 
report.  Although we commend the District Court’s painstaking 
effort to analyze nearly a century of building and 
manufacturing activity by multiple parties to allocate costs 
equitably between Greenlease and Trinity, the attempt to 
untangle the evidentiary knot presented by the parties fell 
short. 
 
 Before addressing the District Court’s cost allocation 
methodology, we begin with the methodology that Gormley 
proposed in his expert report and explained somewhat at trial.  
Gormley’s report presented a six-step approach to allocating 
costs.  First, using “historical information and investigation 
findings,” Gormley assigned a percentage of responsibility to 
each party for contamination in each area of concern, (D.I. 285-
2 at 10), and he applied those percentages to the impact areas 
within each area of concern.  He documented that step in 
Tables 4-1 and 6-2.  Second, he calculated the quantity of 
material in each impact area that was subject to specific major 
remediation activities.  That step was documented in Table 6-
2.  Third, he multiplied the estimated quantities of material 
used for (or remediated by) major remediation activities by 
each party’s percentage of responsibility for contaminating 
each impact area.  Fourth, he summed results from step three 
to develop Trinity’s and Greenlease’s respective responsibility 
percentages “for each major remediation activity[.]”  (Id.)  
Fifth, he multiplied the percentage of responsibility for each 
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major remediation activity by the cost of each such activity to 
determine how to allocate the costs for each.  Finally, Gormley 
totaled how much in costs each party was responsible for 
across all major remediation activities “to calculate a total 
percent cost allocation for the major remediation activities.”  
(D.I. 285-2 at 10.)  Steps five and six were documented in 
Table 7-1.  The report opined that the final percentage 
calculated at step six could be used to allocate the “general 
construction costs” (i.e., costs that were incurred on a project-
wide basis that were not tied to a specific impact area) between 
both parties.  Gormley’s expert report presented his 
methodology as a single analysis with multiple steps.15 
 
 Gormley’s testimony at trial, however, muddied his 
otherwise straightforward methodology.  At trial, he described 
his methodology as a “three-stage process.”  (D.I. 340 at 108.)  
Stage 1, termed the “AOC-by-AOC percentage allocation,” 
involved creating a percentage allocation specific to each area 
of concern; stage 2, termed the “IA-by-IA percentage 
allocation,” involved creating a percentage allocation for each 
impact area; and stage 3, termed “major remediation 
allocation,” involved creating a specific allocation for each 
major remediation activity.  (D.I. 340 at 108-11.)  Trinity’s 
counsel, in a perhaps confusingly worded set of questions, 
asked if each stage was meant “to be mutually exclusive” of 
the other stages, (D.I. 340 at 111), by which he appears to have 
been asking if each “stage” was a separate and distinct 
methodology that could be used to allocate costs, as opposed 
to steps in a single methodology.  In a truly confusing answer, 
                                              
 15  While the report did not break the methodology into 
the six discrete steps we describe here, it did have each of the 
steps, and identifying them separately is, we believe, helpful. 
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Gormley stated that the three stages “weren’t supposed to be 
mutually exclusive,” and he went on to testify that “[t]he first 
[stage] could be taken on its own,” but that the second and third 
stages built on the first stage.  (D.I. 340 at 111.)  He ultimately 
agreed with Trinity’s counsel, however, that each of his three 
stages “could be used by someone who was trying to develop 
their own logical or fair means to allocate responsibility for the 
contamination at the North Plant[.]”  (D.I. 340 at 111.)  
Gormley’s testimony departed from his expert report in a 
crucial way – his report made clear that each step in the 
methodology built on those that came before it, and that they 
were not independent means to come up with a cost allocation.  
His testimony, however, was less than clear as to whether the 
“stages” of his methodology were each independent analytical 
means to allocate costs or steps that built on one another.   
 
 Led by the unclear testimony, the District Court chose 
Gormley’s “stage 3” – divorced from the analytical 
foundations for that stage in the earlier steps of Gormley’s 
analysis – to guide its cost allocation analysis.16  That at least 
                                              
16   The District Court interpreted Gormley’s trial 
testimony as establishing that “[e]ach of the three methods 
used by [him] could be used on its own—without considering 
the other two methods—to allocate responsibility for the 
contamination at the North Plant.”  (App. at 249.)  Although 
that conclusion was understandable based on Gormley’s 
testimony, it was mistaken.  While Gormley agreed that 
“someone who was trying to develop their own logical or fair 
means to allocate responsibility” could incorporate any one of 
his stages into an allocation methodology, (D.I. 340 at 111), he 
never testified that someone could separate out one stage, and 
then use that stage’s allocation methodology alone to allocate 
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appears to have been the Court’s approach because it titled its 
allocation analysis, “Overall Allocation of Responsibility 
based upon Major Remediation Activity”; it stated that it 
“determined an overall allocation based upon the extent of each 
major remediation activity in each [impact area]”; it explicitly 
listed the major remediation activities it “considered … in its 
calculation”; and it cited Table 7-1 – the table corresponding 
to Gormley’s stage 3 – when reaching its allocation 
determination.  (App. at 375-77.)  The District Court, however, 
materially deviated from Gormley’s suggested major 
remediation activity allocation methodology by focusing only 
on the quantity of material involved in all major remediation 
activities, without distinguishing between activities and 
without regard to cost.  That was despite Gormley’s testimony 
confirming “that a central feature of the analysis … reflected 
in [Table] 7-1 is [the] notion of the … costs[.]”  (D.I. 341 at 
33.) 
 
 The District Court’s allocation methodology proceeded 
in four steps.  First, it made its own factual determinations 
regarding the percentage of responsibility each party bore for 
contamination in each specific impact area.17  Second, it 
totaled, for each impact area, the quantity of material used or 
remediated by major remediation activities.  The Court’s 
analysis did not differentiate between remediation activities.  
For example, it treated placing asphalt caps and placing topsoil 
                                              
all cleanup costs for remediating contamination at the North 
Plant. 
 
17  We find no error in the Court’s underlying factual 
findings with regard to the contamination in each specific 
impact area. 
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as functionally the same for its cost allocation analysis despite 
the fact that those two activities’ costs vary significantly.  
Third, it multiplied, on an impact area-specific basis, each 
party’s percentage of responsibility for contamination with the 
total quantity of material used or remediated.  Fourth, it used 
the resulting numbers to determine the percentage of material, 
in total, for which each party was responsible.  That calculation 
led the Court to attribute to Greenlease 83% of responsibility 
for the contamination of the North Plant and to Trinity 17%.  
The Court, citing Gormley’s testimony and expert report, used 
those percentages to allocate “all response costs …, including 
responsibility investigation, removal and remedial past costs 
incurred through February 2015, for general construction costs, 
… and future construction costs for ongoing operations and 
maintenance work.”  (App. at 377 (emphasis omitted).)  Those 
percentages, however, were too speculative for two reasons.  
First, the Court’s methodology failed to differentiate between 
different remediation activities and their varied costs, and, 
second, the methodology, as applied, treated data measured in 
square feet as equivalent to data measured in cubic yards. 
 
 Although the District Court’s reliance on volumetric 
data as the key factor in allocating response costs is not without 
support in our case law, its use here was flawed.18  In Agere 
Systems, Inc. v. Advanced Environmental Technology 
Corporation, we endorsed a volumetric-centered approach to 
                                              
18  Although we determine that the District Court erred 
in utilizing the cost allocation methodology that it did, the 
Court’s use of volumetric data and a focus on major 
remediation activity as a means to determine the allocation of 
response costs was reasonable and within the Court’s 
discretion. 
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allocating CERCLA costs because, in that case, “volume 
allocation likely reflect[ed] the dollar amounts” at issue.  602 
F.3d at 236.  We clarify here that such a volumetric-centered 
approach is only appropriate where the evidence supports a 
finding that one standardized volumetric unit correlates with a 
standardized per unit measure of cost.  That may often be the 
case when a CERCLA cleanup involves only one impact area, 
or when a cleanup involves one primary major remediation 
activity.  But when, as here, an environmental cleanup involves 
many impact areas and remediation activities with varying 
costs, a volumetric-centered approach that fails to account for 
cost differences will very likely lead to an allocation that is 
inequitable because it is divorced from the record evidence and 
analytically unsound.  When, as a hypothetical example, 100 
units of material that costs $1 per unit to remediate are treated 
the same as 100 units of material that costs $10 per unit to 
remediate, the analysis will be hard to justify. 
 
 That kind of error occurred here and was compounded 
when the District Court treated conceptually distinct units of 
measurement as equal.  It added together data measured in 
square feet – a unit of surface area – with data measured in 
cubic yards – a unit of volume.  Performing such a calculation 
was, as Greenlease contends, like comparing “apples to 
oranges.”19  (Green. Opening Br. at 53.)  Without pure 
                                              
19  “Cubic measures and square measures represent 
fundamentally different things.  A cubic measure is always a 
three-dimensional unit of volume: length times width times 
height.  A square measure is always a two-dimensional unit of 
area: length times width.”  Chris Magyar, Cubic Yards to 
Square Feet Conversion, SCIENCING (Mar. 13, 2018), 
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speculation as to the depths at issue for the square footage 
measurements, or record evidence establishing those depths, it 
would not have been possible for the District Court to equate 
cubic yards to square feet.  The Court’s findings of fact and 
conclusions of law do not reflect any such analysis. 
 
 Those problematic deviations from Gormley’s 
methodology compel us to conclude that there was an abuse of 
discretion and that we must vacate the District Court’s 
judgment as to the allocation of costs between Greenlease and 
Trinity.  If the District Court was persuaded by Gormley’s 
analytical approach, then, on remand, it should adhere to the 
cost allocation methodology he set forth in his expert report – 
a methodology that both experts relied upon in coming to their 
respective cost allocation estimates.  That methodology will 
require the Court to conduct a separate cost allocation analysis 
for each major remediation activity.  Much of the information 
needed for that is readily available in the record, but additional 
fact-finding by the District Court may be needed.20 
                                              
https://sciencing.com/cubic-yards-square-feet-conversion-
8641439.html (last visited Aug. 21, 2018). 
 
 20  We reiterate that any cost allocation methodology 
must differentiate between major remediation activities and 
account for the varying costs across those activities.  
Exactitude is not required.  Indeed, at this late date it is 
probably not even possible.  It is enough for the Court to make 
a reasonable estimate of costs based on an appropriate record.  
See Scully, 238 F.3d at 515 (explaining that the law only 
requires that district courts “arrive at an intelligent estimate” of 
CERCLA damages “without speculation or conjecture”; it does 
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 To apply Gormley’s methodology properly, the District 
Court must use volumetric and cost data specific to the 
remediation activities.  For every major remediation activity, 
then, the Court should calculate how much of that activity each 
party was responsible for.  It can then apply that percentage 
breakdown to the total cost of that specific activity at the North 
Plant.  Once it assigns each party a cost allocation for every 
major remediation activity, the Court will be able to add the 
parties’ respective shares of costs together.  From those totals, 
the Court can calculate the overall percentages to use in 
determining an equitable allocation of costs between 
Greenlease and Trinity.  The District Court remains free to 
exercise its discretion to adjust those percentages, subject to 
the guidance provided herein.  It is also free to reopen the 
record, should it determine that it is necessary to do so to carry 
out the kind of analysis we have described.21 
C. Trinity’s Cross-Appeal 
  
 Trinity raises three primary issues in its cross-appeal.  
First, it appeals the District Court’s factual determination of 
                                              
not require courts to arrive at a “mathematical[ly] precise[]” 
figure (citations omitted)). 
 
21  Because we must remand this case, we do not address 
whether Trinity met its burden to prove damages.  However, if 
the Court chooses to reopen the record on remand, we 
encourage it to permit the parties to address whether some 
South Plant costs were impermissibly included in the Court’s 
prior allocation of costs at the North Plant.  It may also allow 
the parties to introduce evidence quantifying the costs incurred 
in remediating contamination caused by third parties. 
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responsibility for the lead contamination at the North Plant.  
We will affirm because we cannot say that the Court abused its 
discretion, given the evidentiary record before it.  Second, 
Trinity challenges the District Court’s decision to grant 
Greenlease equitable deductions to account for the 
Agreement’s indemnification provisions and for the purported 
increase in value of the North Plant following the cleanup.  We 
agree that the District Court erred in the manner in which it 
applied those equitable deductions.  We emphasize, however, 
that the District Court is free on remand to apply equitable 
deductions in accordance with the principles discussed in this 
opinion.  Third, Trinity appeals the District Court’s 
determination that Ampco is not liable for the conduct of 
Greenlease.  We will affirm on that point because Trinity 
cannot demonstrate that Ampco is either directly or 
derivatively liable for Greenlease’s conduct at the North Plant. 
 
1. The District Court’s Allocation of 
Responsibility for Lead Contamination was 
Not an Abuse of Discretion. 
Trinity challenges the District Court’s determination 
that Greenlease’s painting operations did not contribute to lead 
contamination requiring remediation.  It contends that it is 
undisputed that Greenlease’s painting operations at the North 
Plant resulted in lead runoff seeping into the ground.  We 
review an allocation of CERCLA damages for abuse of 
discretion.  Agere Sys., Inc., 602 F.3d at 216.  Given the 
evidence and expert testimony in the record supporting the 
District Court’s determination, we do not agree that there was 
an abuse of discretion. 
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The District Court did not, as Trinity suggests, 
“disregard the co-contributing effects of Greenlease’s lead 
paint releases.”  (Trinity Opening Br. at 64.)  Rather, as the 
Court explained, it found that the historic fill utilized at the 
North Plant by various parties over the years was “the source 
of the lead contamination that required remediation[.]”  (App. 
at 402.)  In other words, the District Court found that any 
contamination by lead paint alone would not have resulted in 
contamination requiring remediation.  The Court then 
incorporated “the overall percentage of responsibility for the 
lead contamination that required remediation” in its equitable 
cost allocation analysis.  (App. at 402.) 
 
The District Court’s finding that historic fill and not 
lead paint was the source of the contamination requiring 
remediation was adequately supported by Greenlease’s expert 
Gerritsen.  He supported his conclusion by studying soil 
samples and observing no correlation between painting 
operations and lead contamination.  In particular, Greenlease’s 
expert observed that lead exceeding PADEP standards was 
consistently present in historic fill rather than native soil.  That 
Trinity’s expert reached a different conclusion – without 
conducting an analysis of soil samples – is of no import.  The 
District Court was entitled to believe Greenlease’s expert 
analysis, as it had adequate support to be admissible.  See 
United States v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 366 F.3d 164, 184 
(3d Cir. 2004) (“[W]hen presented with two sound but 
conflicting expert opinions, a district court has discretion to 
credit one over the other.”).  Accordingly, we will affirm the 
conclusion that Greenlease’s paint operations did not result in 
lead contamination requiring remediation. 
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2. The District Court Abused Its Discretion 
When Granting Equitable Deductions 
Premised on the Indemnification Provisions 
and the Purported Increased Value of the 
North Plant. 
CERCLA grants trial courts broad discretion to 
“allocate response costs among liable parties using such 
equitable factors as the court determines are appropriate.”  42 
U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1).  “Congress intended to grant the district 
courts significant flexibility in determining equitable 
allocations of response costs, without requiring the courts to 
prioritize, much less consider, any specific factor.”  Beazer E., 
Inc. v. Mead Corp., 412 F.3d 429, 446 (3d Cir. 2005).  
However, “[w]e do not simply ‘rubber-stamp’ a district court’s 
equitable allocation[.]”  Lockheed Martin Corp. v. United 
States, 833 F.3d 225, 234 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (citation omitted).  
Rather, we review the equitable allocation of environmental 
cleanup costs for abuse of discretion.  Agere Sys., Inc., 602 
F.3d at 216; Beazer, 412 F.3d at 445 n.18. 
 
Trinity argues that the District Court’s 5% equitable 
deduction in favor of Greenlease due to the contractual 
indemnification provisions, and its 10% equitable deduction in 
favor of Greenlease due to the purported increased value of the 
North Plant, were improper.  We agree, and so too does 
Greenlease, which acknowledges that the District Court’s 
“percentage reductions were completely arbitrary and 
speculative.”  (Green. Opening Br. at 24.)  The District Court 
abused its discretion when it applied the 5% equitable 
deduction because it erroneously interpreted our precedent.  It 
also abused its discretion when it applied the 10% equitable 
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deduction because it failed to explain how it arrived at that 
figure, and we can discern no basis for the figure in the record. 
 
i. The 5% Indemnification Provisions 
Deduction 
 
The District Court relied on our opinion in Beazer East, 
Inc. v. Mead Corporation when it took into consideration the 
Agreement’s indemnification provisions to reduce 
Greenlease’s percentage of responsibility by 5%.  It concluded 
that “it would be error” to not incorporate the parties’ intent, as 
manifested by the three-year limit on the indemnification 
provisions, into its equitable allocation.  (App. at 383.)  It 
reached that conclusion because, in Beazer, we held that it was 
error for a district court to fail to incorporate the relevant 
parties’ mutual intent when entering a contract as part of its 
equitable allocation.  412 F.3d at 448.  In that case, the district 
court had failed to give “significant consideration” to the 
parties’ intent when equitably allocating CERCLA costs, id., 
despite finding that both parties had intended that the 
defendant-seller “would not bear any environmental liability 
following the … sale,” id. at 445.  The district court had 
reasoned that, because the contract at issue did not 
“demonstrate[] a clear and unambiguous intent to transfer all 
CERCLA liability,” as required by the relevant state law, the 
parties’ intent to shift liability should be a subordinate factor to 
the “polluter pays” principle embedded in CERCLA.  Id. at 
447-48.  We said that the district court erred because the legal 
interpretation of the contract did not prevent the court from 
giving, as a matter of equity, significant consideration to “the 
intent of the parties, which [was] manifested by their actions 
and in the written agreement[.]”  Id. at 447. 
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 Critical to our holding in Beazer was the fact that the 
district court had determined that both parties expressed a 
mutual intent to shift CERCLA liabilities following the 
relevant sale.  It was only a nuanced application of state 
contract law that prevented the parties’ mutual intent from 
being enforced as a matter of law.  Therefore, in that case, 
equity demanded that the district court give significant 
consideration to the parties’ shared intent.  Here, in contrast, 
the District Court’s findings make clear that there was no 
mutual intent, as expressed by the written agreement or by the 
actions of both parties, to shift CERCLA liability following the 
sale of the North Plant.  It was, at most, only Greenlease’s 
subjective intent to shed all CERCLA liability following the 
expiration of the three-year indemnification period.  A party’s 
subjective intent to avoid liability, which contradicts the 
agreement at issue, should not be given significant 
consideration when equitably allocating environmental 
cleanup costs.  Because it appears that the District Court here 
mistook Beazer to permit Greenlease’s subjective intent to be 
given substantial weight, its 5% equitable deduction in favor 
of Greenlease was an abuse of discretion. 
 
Nothing we have said here should be interpreted as 
altering the principle set out in Beazer that, as a matter of 
equity, trial courts can take into consideration “the intent of the 
parties … [as] manifested by their actions and in the written 
agreement[.]”  Id. at 447.  But when the intent resulting in the 
equitable deduction is not shared by both parties and appears 
contrary to provisions of the contract, a district court must 
explain why, as a matter of equity, it is nevertheless appropriate 
to award an equitable deduction.  Because we view the District 
Court as having misapplied Beazer, we remand for it to take a 
fresh look at whether it is appropriate, on the record before the 
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Court, to award Greenlease an equitable deduction premised 
on the contractual indemnification provisions. 
 
ii. The 10% Property Value Increase 
Deduction 
 
The District Court concluded that a 10% equitable 
deduction in favor of Greenlease was appropriate because the 
North Plant’s value had increased since the remediation work 
transformed the site from being unsuitable for any productive 
purpose to being usable as a site for some commercial or 
industrial purposes.  Although we agree with the District 
Court’s identification of the increased value of a remediated 
site as an appropriate equitable factor to consider when 
allocating cleanup costs, we cannot agree with its application 
of that principle here because the record did not contain any 
evidence concerning the fair market value of the North Plant, 
either before or after the remediation. 
 
If a landowner successfully seeks contribution from 
others for environmental cleanup costs, that owner should 
likely be required to share the benefits of any increase in value 
brought about by the cleanup.  Courts have thus taken the 
increased market value of a remediated property into 
consideration when allocating response costs.  See, e.g., Litgo 
N.J. Inc. v. Comm’r N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 725 F.3d 369, 
387 (3d Cir. 2013) (discussing the increased value of 
remediated land); Minyard Enters., Inc. v. Se. Chem. & Solvent 
Co., 184 F.3d 373, 387 (4th Cir. 1999) (directing a lower court 
to take into consideration “the fact that the [p]roperty may 
appreciate following its remediation”); Farmland Indus., Inc. 
v. Col. & E. R.R. Co., 944 F. Supp. 1492, 1500-01 (D. Colo. 
1996) (concluding that “it would be inequitable” not to take 
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into account the fact that the former owner “garner[s] no 
tangible benefit from the cleanup of land it no longer owns”).  
Limiting a party’s ability to benefit from an economic windfall 
comports with “CERCLA’s general policy against double 
recovery[.]”  Litgo, 725 F.3d at 391. 
 
The problem with the District Court’s 10% deduction, 
then, was not in the decision to consider the increased market 
value of the North Plant as an equitable factor but rather in the 
application of that factor without any record evidence 
concerning the North Plant’s value.  It is only appropriate to 
take increased value into consideration when there is evidence 
concerning an actual increase, such as proof of the fair market 
value of the property before and after the cleanup.  See N.Y. 
State Elec. & Gas Corp. v. FirstEnergy Corp., 766 F.3d 212, 
239 (2d Cir. 2014) (refusing to take into consideration “the 
economic benefit of the cleanup” because the party seeking the 
equitable deduction “fail[ed] to offer evidence about any 
increase in the value of the land”).  Because the District Court 
may reopen the record for purposes already discussed, see 
supra subsection III.B.3, it may also receive additional 
evidence concerning the fair market value of the North Plant 
site, both before and after the remediation activities, to allow it 
to come to a reasoned percentage reduction premised on the 
increased fair market value, if any, of the North Plant site. 
 
3. The District Court Did Not Err in Deciding 
that Ampco Is Neither Directly Nor 
Derivatively Liable for the Contamination at 
the North Plant. 
 Trinity argues that the District Court erred in 
determining that Ampco was not liable for Greenlease’s share 
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of environmental cleanup costs.  As Trinity sees it, the 
evidence it presented demonstrated genuine issues of material 
fact that were sufficient to entitle it to a trial on the question of 
Ampco’s liability.  It advances two closely related theories to 
support its position that Ampco is legally responsible for 
Greenlease’s conduct at the North Plant.  First, Trinity 
contends that Ampco is directly liable because it qualifies 
under CERCLA as an “operator” of the North Plant.  Second, 
it asserts that, under a veil-piercing theory, Ampco is 
derivatively liable for Greenlease’s operation of the North 
Plant.  Direct and derivative liability are two analytically 
distinct bases for holding a parent company liable for 
environmental cleanup costs resulting from a subsidiary’s 
conduct.  United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 67-68 
(1998). 
 
 We review the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment de novo.  Shelton v. Bledsoe, 775 F.3d 554, 559 (3d 
Cir. 2015).  Summary judgment is appropriate only if, after 
drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving 
party, there exists “no genuine dispute as to any material fact.”  
Shuker v. Smith & Nephew, PLC, 885 F.3d 760, 770 (3d Cir. 
2018) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)).  After our own 
independent assessment of the record evidence, we agree with 
the District Court that Ampco is not liable for Greenlease’s 
conduct at the North Plant, and we will therefore affirm the 
grant of summary judgment in favor of Ampco. 
 
i.  Ampco Is Not Directly Liable for 
Greenlease’s Share of Responsibility 
for Contamination at the North Plant. 
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CERCLA holds an “operator” of a facility “directly 
liable for the costs of cleaning up the pollution.”  Bestfoods, 
524 U.S. at 65.  Direct liability attaches to a parent company 
whose subsidiary owns a facility only if the “act of operating a 
corporate subsidiary’s facility is done on behalf of a parent 
corporation[.]”  Id.  The term “operate” is read according to its 
“ordinary or natural meaning” to refer to “someone who directs 
the workings of, manages, or conducts the affairs of a facility.”  
Id. at 66 (citation omitted).  To be directly liable, “an operator 
must manage, direct, or conduct operations specifically related 
to pollution, that is, operations having to do with the leakage 
or disposal of hazardous waste, or decisions about compliance 
with environmental regulations.”  Id. at 66-67.  Whether 
Ampco is directly liable, therefore, must be based on its 
“participation in the activities of the” North Plant.  Id. at 68.  
Trinity cannot hold Ampco liable for the environmental 
cleanup costs merely by showing that “dual officers and 
directors made policy decisions and supervised activities at the 
facility.”  Id. at 69-70.  Direct liability will only exist if there 
is evidence that Ampco managed the day-to-day activities of 
the North Plant in a manner that exceeds “the interference that 
stems from the normal relationship between parent and 
subsidiary.”  Id. at 71.  As the Supreme Court instructed in 
United States v. Bestfoods, the relevant inquiry for direct 
liability focuses on the relationship between the parent entity 
and the polluting facility, not the parent’s relationship to its 
subsidiary.  Id. at 68. 
 
The District Court rightly determined that the record 
here would not permit a reasonable fact-finder to conclude that 
Ampco’s involvement in the day-to-day operations of the 
North Plant exceeded “the normal relationship between parent 
and subsidiary,” id. at 71, in a manner that would support 
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holding Ampco directly liable for Greenlease’s conduct.  The 
undisputed facts establish, rather, that “[Greenlease] 
employees were responsible for all day-to-day operations at the 
North Plant, including any waste disposal, waste handling, 
painting, abrasive blasting, welding, and fabrication 
operations.”  (App. 81-82.)  Greenlease employees, not Ampco 
employees, coordinated disposal with outside contractors and 
communicated with PADEP on environmental matters.  In fact, 
Ampco “did not employ any engineers or persons with 
technical experience in manufacturing that could make 
decisions for [Greenlease] with respect to environmental 
compliance or waste management.”  (App. at 82.)  Instead, 
“Ampco employed only a professional staff, such as 
accountants, actuaries, and lawyers[.]”  (App. at 82.)  Helping 
with administrative work is consistent with a typical parent-
subsidiary relationship, and certainly does not establish 
Ampco’s direct involvement with the North Plant, which 
Bestfoods demands to hold a parent directly liable for 
environmental cleanup costs. 
 
Trinity maintains that Ampco crossed the line into 
operating the North Plant.  According to Trinity, Ampco did so 
through individuals who advised Greenlease with regard to 
environmental laws and regulations, monitored Greenlease’s 
activities, provided Greenlease with legal advice regarding 
compliance with environmental laws, and were involved with 
Greenlease’s plans to increase the North Plant’s production 
capacity and to modernize its operations.  Trinity does not, 
however, explain how any of those activities, even if one 
accepts Trinity’s take on the evidence, turns Ampco’s 
supervision of Greenlease into anything other than a typical 
parent-subsidiary relationship.  Bestfoods makes clear that 
“[a]ctivities that involve the facility but which are consistent 
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with the parent’s investor status, such as monitoring of the 
subsidiary’s performance, supervision of the subsidiary’s 
finance and capital budget decisions, and articulation of 
general policies and procedures, should not give rise to direct 
liability.”22  524 U.S. at 72 (citation omitted).  That the policies 
Ampco advised on may have included environmental issues 
does not, on this record, change the calculus. 
 
Accordingly, we agree with the District Court’s 
conclusion that Ampco’s actions with respect to the North 
Plant did not fall outside the bounds of typical “parental 
oversight of a subsidiary’s facility,” id., and hence are not a 
basis for direct liability. 
 
                                              
22  Trinity argues that “substantial factual similarities” 
between Bestfoods and the facts here support its argument that 
Ampco is directly liable for Greenlease’s operation of the 
North Plant.  (Trinity Opening Br. at 78.)  It contends that 
“[e]very fact referenced by the Supreme Court in Bestfoods has 
a parallel in this case.”  (Trinity Reply Br. at 20.)  We disagree.  
In Bestfoods, the Supreme Court vacated a judgment in favor 
of a parent corporation because one of its employees “played a 
conspicuous part in dealing with the toxic risks emanating from 
the operation of the [subsidiary’s] plant.”  524 U.S. at 72.  
Here, by contrast, Trinity has not pointed to record evidence 
that any officer, director, or employee of Ampco played a 
significant, let alone conspicuous, role in the operation of the 
North Plant.   
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ii.  Ampco Is Not Derivatively Liable for 
Greenlease’s Share of Responsibility. 
 A parent corporation can be held derivatively liable 
under CERCLA for its subsidiary’s actions “only when[] the 
corporate veil may be pierced[.]”  Id. at 63.  And “the corporate 
veil may be pierced” only in extraordinary circumstances, such 
as when “the corporate form would otherwise be misused to 
accomplish certain wrongful purposes[.]”  Id. at 62; see also 
Wedner v. Unemp’t Comp. Bd. of Review, 296 A.2d 792, 794 
(Pa. 1972) (“The corporate entity or personality will be 
disregarded [o]nly when the entity is used to defeat public 
convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud or defend crime.” 
(citation omitted)).  In such circumstances, the law permits a 
subsidiary to be deemed an “alter ego” of its parent so that the 
parent can be held liable for the actions of its subsidiary.  
Pearson v. Component Tech. Corp., 247 F.3d 471, 484 (3d Cir. 
2001).  Piercing the corporate veil is a limited exception to the 
“general principle of corporate law deeply ingrained in our 
economic and legal systems that a parent corporation … is not 
liable for the acts of its subsidiaries.”  Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 
61 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also 
Lumax Indus., Inc. v. Aultman, 669 A.2d 893, 895 (Pa. 1995) 
(“[T]here is a strong presumption in Pennsylvania against 
piercing the corporate veil.”). 
 
 Trinity seeks to use both federal law and state law to 
pierce the corporate veil.  The federal law principles we have 
articulated for when a subsidiary is merely an alter ego of its 
parent are substantially similar to the principles set forth in 
Pennsylvania case law.  Our analysis of both, therefore, can 
largely proceed in tandem, though we do specifically note 
Trinity’s state law-specific arguments.  Under either theory, 
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Trinity has failed to adduce sufficient evidence to create a 
triable issue of fact. 
 
 We have identified several factors helpful in 
determining whether, as a matter of federal common law, a 
subsidiary is merely an alter ego of its parent.  Those factors 
include “gross undercapitalization, failure to observe corporate 
formalities, nonpayment of dividends, insolvency of 
[subsidiary] corporation, siphoning of funds from the 
[subsidiary] corporation by the dominant stockholder, 
nonfunctioning of officers and directors, absence of corporate 
records, and whether the corporation is merely a façade for the 
operations of the dominant stockholder.”  Pearson, 247 F.3d at 
484-85.23  No single factor is dispositive, and we consider 
whether veil piercing is appropriate in light of the totality of 
the circumstances.  Cf. Trs. of Nat’l Elevator Indus. Pension, 
Health Benefit & Educ. Funds v. Lutyk, 332 F.3d 188, 194 (3d 
Cir. 2003) (explaining that the alter ego test factors do not 
comprise “a rigid test”); Am. Bell Inc. v. Fed’n of Tel. Workers 
of Pa., 736 F.2d 879, 887 (3d Cir. 1984) (requiring “specific, 
unusual circumstances” before piercing the corporate veil 
(citation omitted)).24 
                                              
23  Factors considered by Pennsylvania state courts 
include “undercapitalization, failure to adhere to corporate 
formalities, substantial intermingling of corporate and personal 
affairs and use of the corporate form to perpetrate a fraud.”  
Lumax, 669 A.2d at 895. 
 
24  See also Advanced Tel. Sys., Inc. v. Com-Net Prof’l 
Mobile Radio, LLC, 846 A.2d 1264, 1281 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004) 
(looking to the “totality of circumstances” when conducting 
corporate veil piercing analysis). 
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   Proving that a corporation is merely an alter ego is a 
burden that “is notoriously difficult for plaintiffs to meet.”  
Pearson, 247 F.3d at 485.  “[I]n order to succeed on 
an alter ego theory of liability, plaintiffs must essentially 
demonstrate that in all aspects of the business, the two 
corporations actually functioned as a single entity and should 
be treated as such.”  Id.25  Under our precedent, the basis for 
piercing the corporate veil must be “shown by clear and 
convincing evidence.”  Lutyk, 332 F.3d at 192 (quoting Kaplan 
v. First Options of Chi., Inc., 19 F.3d 1503, 1522 (3d Cir. 
1994)).26 
                                              
 
25  See also E. Minerals & Chem. Co. v. Mahan, 225 
F.3d 330, 333 n.6 (3d Cir. 2000) (explaining that Pennsylvania 
law “require[s] a threshold showing that the controlled 
corporation acted robot- or puppet-like in mechanical response 
to the controller’s tugs on its strings or pressure on its buttons” 
before allowing a plaintiff to pierce the corporate veil (citation 
omitted)); Culbreth v. Amosa (Pty) Ltd., 898 F.2d 13, 14 (3d 
Cir. 1990) (interpreting Pennsylvania law to require that “the 
party seeking to pierce the corporate veil on an alter-ego theory 
establish[] that the controlling corporation wholly ignored the 
separate status of the controlled corporation and so dominated 
and controlled its affairs that its separate existence was a mere 
sham”). 
 
26  Trinity presents three arguments for why the District 
Court erred by applying the clear and convincing evidence 
standard to its alter-ego analysis: that it is always improper for 
a district court to apply that standard to a motion for summary 
judgment, that federal law does not incorporate the clear and 
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 Trinity appears to agree that most of the traditional 
factors we look to when determining whether to pierce the 
corporate veil are either inapplicable to this case or favor 
Ampco.  Its primary arguments for piercing the corporate veil 
are that “Greenlease became undercapitalized when Ampco 
                                              
convincing standard when the plaintiff does not allege fraud, 
and that Pennsylvania applies a preponderance of the evidence 
standard to its alter-ego analysis. 
First, Trinity is incorrect as a matter of law that “under 
no circumstances” is a clear and convincing standard 
“appropriate for summary judgment purposes.”  (Trinity 
Opening Br. at 68.)  “[T]he determination of whether a given 
factual dispute requires submission to a jury must be guided by 
the substantive evidentiary standards that apply to the case.”  
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).  
“Consequently, where the clear and convincing evidence 
standard applies, the trial judge [at summary judgment] must 
inquire whether the evidence presented is such that a jury 
applying that evidentiary standard could find only for one 
side.”  Justofin v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 372 F.3d 517, 522 (3d 
Cir. 2004).  Second, our precedent is clear, as a matter of 
federal common law in this Circuit, that “[b]ecause alter ego is 
akin to and has elements of fraud theory, … it … must be 
shown by clear and convincing evidence.”  Lutyk, 332 F.3d at 
192 (citation omitted).  Trinity has not presented any 
compelling argument to revisit that longstanding proposition.  
Third, we do not need to address the standard of proof we think 
Pennsylvania applies to its alter-ego analysis because, whether 
we apply a preponderance of the evidence standard or a clear 
and convincing evidence standard to the state law analysis, our 
ultimate conclusion is the same – no reasonable fact-finder 
could justify piercing the corporate veil on this record. 
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siphoned off Greenlease’s assets,” that “Ampco and 
Greenlease’s interactions exceeded norms that characterize 
parent/subsidiary relationships,” (Trinity Opening Br. at 74), 
that the equities tilt in its favor under Pennsylvania’s alter-ego 
test, and that public policy favors holding Ampco responsible. 
 
a. Greenlease Was Not 
Undercapitalized and Ampco 
Did Not Siphon Funds From 
Greenlease. 
Trinity argues that Greenlease’s issuing to Ampco some 
$50 million dollars in dividends in the years following the sale 
of the North Plant, leaving only $250,000 in reserve for 
liabilities, favors piercing the corporate veil.  But “the inquiry 
into corporate capitalization is most relevant for the inference 
it provides into whether the corporation was established to 
defraud its creditors or [an]other improper purpose such as 
avoiding the risks known to be attendant to a type of business.”  
Lutyk, 332 F.3d at 197.  There is no basis in the record to 
suggest that Greenlease was undercapitalized while operating 
the North Plant.  Instead, Trinity suggests only that Greenlease 
lacked funds after Greenlease’s operations of the North Plant 
had effectively stopped.  That is of “little relevancy to 
determining whether piercing the corporate veil [is] justified 
here.”  Id. 
 
There is also no evidence that Greenlease issued 
dividends to Ampco with awareness of its liability to Trinity or 
to escape subsequent liability.  See Zubik v. Zubik, 384 F.2d 
267, 273 (3d Cir. 1967) (“Unless done deliberately, with 
specific intent to escape liability for a specific tort or class of 
torts, the cause of justice does not require disregarding the 
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corporate entity.”).  As the District Court noted, “it would be 
unreasonable for Ampco to leave Greenlease’s earnings from 
the sale of the North Plant in an account when at the time the 
dividends were issued Greenlease was a nonoperating 
company with no known liabilities.”  (App. 91 (emphasis 
removed).) 
 
b. Greenlease and Ampco’s 
Relationship Was a Typical 
Parent-Subsidiary 
Relationship. 
Trinity emphasizes that there was significant overlap 
between the boards of Ampco and Greenlease and argues that 
Ampco dominated Greenlease to an unusual extent.  But 
“duplication of some or all of the directors or executive 
officers” is not fatal to maintaining legally distinct corporate 
forms.  Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 62 (citation omitted); see also 
Am. Bell, 736 F.2d at 887 (noting that “there must be specific, 
unusual circumstances” to justify veil piercing, and mere 
control and participation in management is inadequate).  
Greenlease ran the North Plant and hired all of the employees 
on the ground.  Although Ampco was required to approve large 
decisions, Greenlease generally functioned with autonomy on 
decisions concerning manufacturing, environmental 
compliance, and disposal of waste.  We have already said and 
now repeat that the District Court rightly determined that the 
record simply does not support Trinity’s position that 
Greenlease’s relationship with Ampco was materially different 
than a normal parent-subsidiary relationship.   
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c. Trinity Cannot Pierce the 
Corporate Veil Under 
Pennsylvania Law. 
Trinity argues that the District Court erred by 
disregarding the “equitable underpinnings” of Pennsylvania’s 
alter-ego framework.  (Trinity Reply Br. at 6.)  It maintains that 
Pennsylvania disregards the legal fiction of separate corporate 
entities “whenever justice or public policy demand[s]” it.  
(Trinity Reply Br. at 7 (quoting Ashley v. Ashley, 393 A.2d 637, 
641 (Pa. 1978).)  According to Trinity, permitting Ampco to 
reap the benefits of the over $50 million in dividends from 
Greenlease without being held accountable for Greenlease’s 
conduct is an injustice.  But Trinity overlooks that 
Pennsylvania requires a plaintiff seeking to pierce the 
corporate veil to make “a threshold showing that the controlled 
corporation acted robot- or puppet-like in mechanical 
response” to the controlling shareholder’s demands.  E. 
Minerals & Chem. Co. v. Mahan, 225 F.3d 330, 333 n.6 (3d 
Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).  Trinity has not made that 
showing here. 
 
Pennsylvania law is also clear that courts are not to 
disregard the legal fiction of separate corporate entities if it 
would render “the theory of the corporate entity … useless.”  
Ashley, 393 A.2d at 641; see also Wedner, 296 A.2d at 795 
(“Care should be taken on all occasions to avoid making the 
entire theory of the corporate entity … useless.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Zubik, 384 F.2d at 273)).  
To permit Trinity to pierce the corporate veil in this instance, 
in the face of all the objective criteria favoring Ampco, would, 
in essence, result in rendering useless Ampco’s legitimate use 
of the corporate form when setting up Greenlease as a 
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subsidiary.  The record is devoid of evidence that Ampco 
misused separate corporate entities for some nefarious 
purpose.  To pierce the corporate veil would thus fly in the face 
of Pennsylvania’s “strong presumption … against piercing the 
corporate veil.”  Lumax, 669 A.2d at 895. 
 
d. Public Policy Considerations 
Do Not Favor Trinity. 
 
Finally, Trinity argues that the District Court failed to 
consider public policy justifications for piercing the corporate 
veil to ensure that the “polluter pays.”  (Trinity Opening Br. at 
74.)  As discussed above, however, both federal and 
Pennsylvania law favor maintaining the legal fiction of 
separate corporate entities.  Because the evidence does not 
suggest that there was fraud or an attempt to use a corporate 
façade as an alter ego, public policy first favors upholding the 
integrity of the corporate form.  Trinity has not presented any 
public policy consideration sufficiently compelling to 
overcome the strong presumption against veil piercing. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm in part but will 
vacate the District Court’s cost allocation determination and 
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
